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Foreword 
The present report aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the pandemic situation of COVID-19 in the 
EU countries, and to be able to foresee the situation in the next coming days. 
We employ an empirical model, verified with the evolution of the number of confirmed cases in previous 
countries where the epidemic is close to conclude, including all provinces of China. The model does not 
pretend to interpret the causes of the evolution of the cases but to permit the evaluation of the quality of 
control measures made in each state and a short-term prediction of trends. Note, however, that the effects 
of the measures’ control that start on a given day are not observed until approximately 7-10 days later. 
 The model and predictions are based on two parameters that are daily fitted to available data: 
 a: the velocity at which spreading specific rate slows down; the higher the value, the better the 
control.  
 K: the final number of expected cumulated cases, which cannot be evaluated at the initial stages 
because growth is still exponential. 
We show an individual report with 8 graphs and a table with the short-term predictions for different 
countries and regions. We are adjusting the model to countries and regions with at least 4 days with more 
than 100 confirmed cases and a current load over 200 cases. The predicted period of a country depends on 
the number of datapoints over this 100 cases threshold, and is of 5 days for those that have reported more 
than 100 cumulated cases for 10 consecutive days or more. For short-term predictions, we assign higher 
weight to last 3 points in the fittings, so that changes are rapidly captured by the model. The whole 
methodology employed in the inform is explained in the last pages of this document. 
In addition to the individual reports, the reader will find an initial dashboard with a brief analysis of the 
situation in EU-EFTA-UK countries, some summary figures and tables as well as long-term predictions for 
some of them, when possible. These long-term predictions are evaluated without different weights to data-
points. We also discuss a specific issue every day.  
Martí Català  
Pere-Joan Cardona, PhD 
Comparative Medicine and Bioimage Centre of 
Catalonia; Institute for Health Science Research 






Clara Prats, PhD  
Sergio Alonso, PhD 
Enric Álvarez, PhD 
Miquel Marchena 
David Conesa 
Daniel López, PhD 
Computational Biology and Complex Systems; 
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya - BarcelonaTech 
 
With the collaboration of: Guillem Álvarez, Oriol Bertomeu, Laura Dot, Lavínia Hriscu, Helena Kirchner, Daniel 
Molinuevo, Pablo Palacios, Sergi Pradas, David Rovira, Xavier Simó, Tomás Urdiales 
PJC and MC received funding from “la Caixa” Foundation (ID 100010434), under agreement 
LCF/PR/GN17/50300003; CP, DL, SA, MC, received funding from Ministerio de Ciencia, 
Innovación y Universidades and FEDER, with the project PGC2018-095456-B-I00; 
Disclaimer: These reports have been written by declared authors, who fully assume their 
content. They are submitted daily to the European Commission, but this body does not 






































Situation and highlights 
While in Europe we are concerned about 
controlling local outbreaks and clusters, 
the situation worldwide is frightening. 
Globally, there are more than 10.4 million 
cases diagnosed and more than 500 
thousand deaths. The most worrying thing 
is that the intensity and spread of the 
pandemic continues to grow. Currently, 
more than 170,000 new cases are 
diagnosed every day, and the number of 
daily deaths is above 4,000. The pandemic 
has huge magnitudes in the USA and 
Brazil. In the USA, there are already more 
than 2.6 million cases diagnosed and more 
of 125,000 deaths. In Brazil, more than 1.4 
million cases and nearly 60,000 deaths. Looking at relative numbers, in terms of cases per 100,000 
inhabitants, the worst countries are Chile and Brazil, followed closely by the USA, Perú and Arabia Saudi.  
At EU+EFTA+UK, Sweden is still in the red zone, although the lack of continuity in data is masking the real 
situation, that could be better than the indicators suggest. Portugal does not improve, yet, and several 
countries show symptoms of regrowth. Right now, it is to be hoped that Public Health services will be able to 
break the transmission chains and decrease the number of risk situations. 
The map in the left shows current A14. The map in the right shows current EPG.         
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(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2,3) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential. EPGREP is the product of attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by 
ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). EPGEST is the product of estimated real attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants and ρ7. Biocom-Cov degree is an epidemiological situation 
scale based on the level of last week’s mean daily new cases (https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189661, https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189808). 
 
Situation and trends per country 
Table of current situation in EU countries. Colour scale is relative except when indicated, this means that it is applied independently to each column, and distinguishes 
best (green) form worst (red) situations according to each of the variables. Last column (EPGEST) is assessed with estimated real 14-day attack rate (see report from 
22/04 for details). EPGREP is calculated with data reported by countries. EPGREP and EPGEST cannot be compared between them because scales are different, but can 
be independently used for estimating risk of countries according to reported or estimated real situation, respectively.    
 
Disclaimer: estimated active cases and estimated 14-day attack rate are assessed by assuming a lethality of 1 % (see report from 20 to 24 April, #37-41). This value can change in 




Analysis: The structure of the virus spreading presents serious hurdles for Bluetooth 
technology to be useful in test and trace procedures. The 20% threshold (II). 
Last week we discussed two key features, one epidemiological and another structural to the 
telecommunication market, that presented serious hurdles for Bluetooth tracing applications. Combined, 
they make it impossible to rely on this technology to control the epidemics on its own and point to the fact 
that, actually, the apps could even become detrimental to the efforts. 
First hurdle: Difficulties to distinguish dangerous from non-dangerous interactions 
The key epidemiological feature of Covid-19 that affects how apps work is that the number of people that 
are detected passively because they develop important symptoms is no larger than 30%. This means that, in 
order to detect a good fraction of potential new cases, one needs to be able to perform PCR to anyone with 
self-reported very mild symptoms and having it under control. In this sense, and given that making PCR to all 
contacts of a case is right now impossible, a good selection of those that have more probability to develop 
the disease is key. In other words, most of the epidemics have environments where the virus is easier to 
propagate, but if a large fraction of these cases were to develop symptoms, localization of this environment 
and their close contacts with an app will be straightforward. This does not happen in this case. A selection of 
those people that have more chances to get infected becomes key. Right now, apps are just not ready to 
be able to differentiate between a noise party-like bus from a quiet bus. They cannot distinguish a close 
contact in the interior of a loud bar from the exterior of a quiet terrace. Recent epidemiological data and 
observational studies (the last one from Japan1, for example), indicates that this is a key factor of the 
epidemics spreading. 
Second hurdle: Limited penetration of apps and Bluetooth use 
The second hurdle that we discussed was the penetration and use of Bluetooth smart app applications. In 
order to have it working properly, a smartphone is needed with the proper app. The data we provided last 
week indicates that smartphone penetration is, at most, 70% and that the most common apps penetrate 
90% of this market. Therefore, 60% is the maximum penetration of this kind of apps. We think that the 
maximum possible is even lower, given that it needs an active user that can activate the Bluetooth or at least, 
not turn it off. Given that maximum penetration of more complex apps like Facebook are 50%, and that young 
cohorts may not wish to have the Bluetooth on, having a total 50% penetration seems like the largest 
possible penetration to us. 
Using this 50% as the maximum penetration available, it is easy to compute that the maximum number of 
contacts traceable by these apps is 25% of the total number of contacts. Still, the most probable outcome is 
that total penetration of the app will be more similar to Facebook, being selected by people compromised 
with the control of the epidemics and that they indeed will be sure to have Bluetooth on. In this case, the 
app will have a penetration of around 35%, and it will be able to detect around 12 % of the contacts. 
The positive side of that is that no government will consider this technology as the core of the strategy to 
control the epidemics. So, there is no need to make any PCR to those contacts that are indeed detected. Any 
person with the app connected to a positive case could just receive a warning and stay at home at will. If 
he/she has made the effort to download the app, he/she will probably head the call.  
Third hurdle: Infections not driven by close contact 
We address now the third hurdle that SARS-CoV-2 presents to contact tracing with Bluetooth apps. We 
proceed to give the details later on, but let us give first the conclusion in this case so as to relate it directly 




with the previous numbers. The idea is that the number of relevant contacts which have not been in a short-
distance and cannot be detected by Bluetooth is, in a rather optimistic scenario, around 15-20% of the total 
number of contacts. This means, that the maximum contact capacity is not 25% but 20%, and that the most 
probable capacity is closer to 10% rather than 15%. All in all, in an optimistic scenario, apps can help to put 
at home 10-20% of the troublesome contacts, in the more realistic, around 5-10%, and in a slightly 
pessimistic between 1-5%. 
Let us now describe why the total number of relevant contacts never at a close distance is probably around 
20-30% of total contacts. First, we must clarify what we aim to accomplish with this estimation. We know 
that Bluetooth technology can detect people further apart than 2 m, but doing so will include hundreds upon 
thousands of people. It must be also reliable, so we consider that the app will be set to be able to detect 
people at a 2-meter range for 15 minutes. All of them are potentially detectable by the app in our hypothesis 
if the people interacting have a smartphone with the app on. We also know that a non-negligible part of the 
infections is produced by people in contact for more than 15 minutes but that are further away than 2 m and 
will not be detected. The main venues for contagion without even the possibility of app detection are three: 
1) Air conditioning increases the range that can be considered close. Infection happen at a distance 
way larger than 2 meters2. Think of tables in a restaurant 5 meters apart with AC activated. 
2) Sharing of a space with bad ventilation in closed doors where the infected has been for a long time 
and left, while other people get into the same room afterwards. Think of the bathroom in a large 
conference. 
3) Sharing of objects by people not in close contact via areas which act as common facilities. Think of 
common areas like buffets in hotels or alcohol bars in parties.  
A proper human contact tracing analysis would be able to consider a fraction of the people attending a 
conference or a party as potential “close contacts”, despite not being physically close for 15 minutes. They 
are epidemiologically close (EC) but not physically close (PC). People in a restaurant table for 3 hours 5 
meters away from an infected people with air conditioning close on are EC but not PC. A person in the same 
situation outside is not EC.  Our goal is not to determine the ratio of people who, in any kind of contact, could 
have a small chance of getting infected with respect to the total number of contacts. That would be a very 
large number and render any app useless by default since the number of people who stay more than 15 
minutes between 2 and 10 meters is huge. Our goal is to establish how many EC contacts exist compared 
with the total, using a conservative number. 
Evaluation of the epidemiologically close contacts  
Let us recall that the present estimation of diffusion parameter is around 0.1-0.2. This means that 80% of the 
propagation is done in large clusters and 20% in small clusters. In small cluster, close contacts are key for 
propagation. You propagate to a close family member or a friend. So, the presence of relevant EC contacts is 
only relevant in the 80% that happen in large clusters.  
From the 80% of infections in large clusters, most will come from contacts of the people that are already 
normally close to you. The only difference is that spending four hours with your friend in the beach has a 
much lower probability of infection than inside a packed restaurant without mask and bad ventilation/with 
AC, for example. So, it is clear that probably more than half of those relevant contacts in large clusters are 
really physical contacts that the app can detect. If we set a moderate 30% as a useful guide of those that are 
epidemiologically in close contact but not physically in large cluster, we will have roughly 30% of 80% (this is 
25%) of real contacts as undetectable by a Bluetooth app. 




If we look at a particular example, we can see more clearly where the first 30% comes from. Consider a typical 
party of 100 people where up to 20 become infected, as it has been reported in different clusters. Let us 
make now educated guesses about the relation of the infected person with other people in the party. We 
consider that the infected goes at least with a group of very close friends (1-10) and has other personal 
relation that guarantees sharing more than 15 minutes together with at least another 10-30. We will consider 
that the remaining 60-80 people are barely known and do not generate any PC, only very brief interactions. 
We know that in a disco this number can be way larger and in private parties this number can be way lower. 
We just take our numbers as a middle ground example. 
With these numbers in mind we can use a second relevant estimation from the literature: the probability of 
getting infected with people sharing your life for three-four days (more than 20 hours) is around 20%. We 
can think that, in this party, the probability of getting infected by a very close physical contact can be around 
this value, probably higher, but not much more given that normal parties last around 5-10 hours, way lower 
that the time spent with very close contacts for three-four days. We can give a little bit more than 1/3 
probability for the close contacts and 1/4 for those with physical contact (more than 15 minutes). 
In this case, 0-4 close friends will become infected, 4-8 of those belonging to the second ring of friends will 
become infected (see figure below). All in all, around 10 might come from those 30 detectable by the app. It 
is the other 10 that are not known who are the key. Those 10 infected can be people which have been 
effectively close because they shared a glass, or the bathroom. They could be EC contacts because of AC. 
However, we cannot expect that all the people in the party are EC contact if they have not been somewhere 
near the infected person. The probability of infection for all the other can indeed 1/7 and all of them could 
certainly be infected: this would mean that all people attending the party are relevant. However, it makes 
more sense to think that a subgroup of them have a probability of becoming infected of the order of 1/4 and 
1/5 because they are EC contacts.  
 
All in all, we consider that we take 25-50% of those at the party that one is not PC as EC. In other words, we 
are basically saying that roughly 20-40 people in the party will be detected by the app and that 15-30 will not 
be detected by the app but actually should. This is roughly 30-50%. However, these encounters represent 
only 80% of the real encounters, reaching the number 25-40%. Since we want to be conservative, we take 
the lower range 25-30%. 
Discussion 
All the numbers above should be taken just as broad estimations to give just an order of magnitude value. It 
must be coupled with another analysis regarding the possibility that the number of infections coming from 
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people not in physical contact is lower than 25-30%. Given the uncertainty associated with any data in an 
evolving epidemic, we cannot know for sure. However, if the dispersion parameter is correct, and the effects 
of sharing objects or AC are detectable and conformed by observational studies, we think that, even in the 
most optimistic scenario, the fraction of people infected by other people who are more than 2 meters apart 
for some hours in an epidemiologically dangerous environment (parties, common rooms, singing classes, AC 
crowded interiors) must be at least 10%. Otherwise, we doubt that the relevance of clusters will be so large, 
or that the observational studies were so clear, in identifying these dangerous situations. In other words, if 
the picture we have right now of the structure of the virus propagation is right, the relevance of clusters is 
very important and the ways one can get infected without physical distance very diverse. In this scenario, 
the possibility that basically all infections are produced at close physical contact seems far-fetched. 
Finally, one must not disregard the possibility that the app can become way smarter in differentiating 
environments. Voice recordings, geo-localization and other tools could provide information regarding the 
“dangerousness” of the setting and change the distance detection range accordingly. The development of 
such technology is not impossible, but its development is probably as complex as the development of vaccine 
or any other therapeutics. From what we know, there is no plan to develop one, neither the corresponding 
security and privacy issues related with it.  
In conclusion, a simple app can be a very small help at the margin that does not consume resources. 
However, everything indicates that the best use of technology is probably providing useful tools to contact 
tracers so as to make the calls to physically and epidemiologically close contacts and the gathering of data 
form the interviews less time consuming (see ECDC report3). 
 
 
                                                          
3 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/COVID-19-resources-for-contact-tracing-2-March-2020.pdf 
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(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2,3) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential. EPGREP is the product of attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by 
ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). EPGEST is the product of estimated real attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants and ρ7. Biocom-Cov degree is an epidemiological situation 
scale based on the level of last week’s mean daily new cases (https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189661, https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189808). 
 
Situation and trends in other countries 
Table of current situation in a sample of non-EU countries. Colour scale is relative except when indicated, this means that it is applied independently to each column, 
and distinguishes best (green) form worst (red) situations according to each of the variables. EPGREP and EPGEST cannot be compared between them because scales 
are different, but can be independently used for estimating risk of countries according to reported or estimated real situation, respectively.    
 
Disclaimer: estimated active cases and estimated 14-day attack rate are assessed by assuming a lethality of 1 % (see report from 20 to 24 April, #37-41). This value can change in 




Time indicators by country 
These tables summarize a few time indicators for each country: time since 50 cases were reported, time 
interval between an attack rate of 1/105 inhabitants and an attack rate of 10/105 inhabitants, and time 






















Evaluated with the whole historical series. Up-left: Predictions of maximum incidences per country at the 
end of the first wave (total final expected attack rate per 105 inh.). Up-right: Predictions of maximum 
absolute number of cases per country at the end of the first wave (K, in log scale). Blue lines indicate current 
situation. Bottom-left: Time in which peak in new cases was achieved / will be achieved. Bottom-right: Time 
at which 90 % of K was achieved / will be achieved. Blue dotted line indicates current date.  
 
Final expected value for EU+EFTA+UK as a whole is not shown any more, since we are in the tail (see 










Situation and trends in Italian and Spanish regions 
Italy 
Data from 01st July 
 
Spain  
Data from 25th June, series built with the day of symptoms’ onset 
 
Disclaimer: estimated active cases and estimated 14-day attack rate are assessed by assuming a lethality of 1 % (see 
report from 20 to 24 April, #37-41). This value can change in countries where suspicious deaths are reported as well 
(real values would be lower) and in countries where incidence among elderly people was minor (real values would be 
higher).  
 (1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2,3) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential. EPGREP is the 
product of attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). EPGEST is the product of 
estimated real attack-rate of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants and ρ7. Biocom-Cov degree is an epidemiological situation 
scale based on the level of last week’s mean daily new cases (https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189661, 
https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/189808). 
 
Long-term predictions are not shown any more, since all Italian and Spanish regions are already in the tail 















Madrid 71,689 1,079.5 721 10.9 0.87 9 3
Catalunya 56,187 742.7 1,062 14.0 1.4 20 3
Castilla y Leon 26,616 1,105.3 246 10.2 1.01 10 3
Castilla-La Mancha 22,253 1,093.2 185 9.1 0.89 8 2
Andalucia 16,709 198.3 231 2.7 2.58 7 2
Comunitat Valenciana 14,816 297.8 86 1.7 0.67 1 1
Euskadi 14,576 669.2 117 5.4 0.98 5 2
Galicia 10,742 397.8 48 1.8 2.13 4 2
Navarra 7,884 1,213.0 96 15 2.0 30 3
Aragon 6,852 518.8 414 31.3 3.01 94 5
Extremadura 5,659 531.2 37 3.5 1.60 6 2
La Rioja 3,993 1,273.4 6 1.9 1.07 2 1
Canarias 2,497 113.1 44 2.0 0.33 1 1
Murcia 2,462 165.5 35 2.4 1.28 3 2
Asturias 2,435 238.2 0 0.0 0.00 0 0
Cantabria 2,349 403.8 25 4.3 1.62 7 2
Baleares 2,328 196.0 50 4.2 0.81 3 2
Ceuta 222 261.7 0 0.0 NA NA 0
Melilla 139 164.1 3 3.5 NA NA 0
Worst Worst Worst Worst 2.0 200






Legend: Countries’ reports details 
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Data obtained from  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases  
 


































































Data obtained from https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases  
 
(2) Analysis and prediction of COVID-19 












































Data updated on 1st July, data series built with 
the day of the symptoms’ onset, reliable until 










Data obtained from https://github.com/datadista/datasets/tree/master/COVID%2019 and 
https://covid19.isciii.es/  
 
(3) Analysis and prediction of COVID-19 



























































 Data obtained from: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19/tree/master/dati-andamento-nazionale  
 
(4) Analysis and prediction of COVID-19 

























































(1) Data source 
Data are daily obtained from World Health Organization (WHO) surveillance reports4, from European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)5 and from Ministerio de Sanidad6. These reports are converted 
into text files that can be processed for subsequent analysis. Daily data comprise, among others: total 
confirmed cases, total confirmed new cases, total deaths, total new deaths. It must be considered that the 
report is always providing data from previous day. In the document we use the date at which the datapoint 
is assumed to belong, i.e., report from 15/03/2020 is giving data from 14/03/2020, the latter being used in 
the subsequent analysis.  
(2) Data processing and plotting 
Data are initially processed with Matlab in order to update timeseries, i.e., last datapoints are added to 
historical sequences. These timeseries are plotted for EU individual countries and for the UE as a whole: 
 Number of cumulated confirmed cases, in blue dots 
 Number of reported new cases 
 Number of cumulated deaths  
Then, two indicators are calculated and plotted, too: 
 Number of cumulated deaths divided by the number of cumulated confirmed cases, and reported as 
a percentage; it is an indirect indicator of the diagnostic level. 
 ρ: this variable is related with the reproduction number, i.e., with the number of new infections 
caused by a single case. It is evaluated as follows for the day before last report (t-1): 
𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡 − 1) =
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 2)
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 5) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 6) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 7)
 
where Nnew(t) is the number of new confirmed cases at day t.  
(3) Classification of countries according to their status in the epidemic cycle 
The evolution of confirmed cases shows a biphasic behaviour:  
(I) an initial period where most of the cases are imported; 
(II) a subsequent period where most of new cases occur because of local transmission.  
Once in the stage II, mathematical models can be used to track evolutions and predict tendencies. Focusing 
on countries that are on stage II, we classify them in three groups: 
• Group A: countries that have reported more than 100 cumulated cases for 10 consecutive days or 
more; 
• Group B: countries that have reported more than 100 cumulated cases for 7 to 9 consecutive days; 
• Group C: countries that have reported more than 100 cumulated cases for 4 to 6 days. 
 








(4) Fitting a mathematical model to data 
Previous studies have shown that Gompertz model7 correctly describes the Covid-19 epidemic in all analysed 
countries. It is an empirical model that starts with an exponential growth but that gradually decreases its 
specific growth rate. Therefore, it is adequate for describing an epidemic that is characterized by an initial 
exponential growth but a progressive decrease in spreading velocity provided that appropriate control 
measures are applied.   
Gompertz model is described by the equation:  





where N(t) is the cumulated number of confirmed cases at t (in days), and N0 is the number of cumulated 
cases the day at day t0. The model has two parameters: 
 a is the velocity at which specific spreading rate is slowing down; 
 K is the expected final number of cumulated cases at the end of the epidemic. 
This model is fitted to reported cumulated cases of the UE and of countries in stage II that accomplish two 
criteria: 4 or more consecutive days with more than 100 cumulated cases, and at least one datapoint over 
200 cases. Day t0 is chosen as that one at which N(t) overpasses 100 cases. If more than 15 datapoints that 
accomplish the stated criteria are available, only the last 15 points are used. The fitting is done using Matlab’s 
Curve Fitting package with Nonlinear Least Squares method, which also provides confidence intervals of 
fitted parameters (a and K) and the R2 of the fitting. At the initial stages the dynamics is exponential and K 
cannot be correctly evaluated. In fact, at this stage the most relevant parameter is a. Fitted curves are 
incorporated to plots of cumulative reported cases with a dashed line. Once a new fitting is done, two plots 
are added to the country report: 
 Evolution of fitted a with its error bars, i.e., values obtained on the fitting each day that the analysis 
has been carried out;  
 Evolution of fitted K with its error bars, i.e., values obtained on the fitting each day that the analysis 
has been carried out; if lower error bar indicates a value that is lower than current number of cases, 
the error bar is truncated. 
These plots illustrate the increase in fittings’ confidence, as fitted values progressively stabilize around a 
certain value and error bars get smaller when the number of datapoints increases. In fact, in the case of 
countries, they are discarded and set as “Not enough data” if a>0.2 day-1, if K>106 or if the error in K 
overpasses 106. 
It is worth to mention that the simplicity of this model and the lack of previous assumptions about the Covid-
19 behaviour make it appropriate for universal use, i.e., it can be fitted to any country independently of its 
socioeconomic context and control strategy. Then, the model is capable of quantifying the observed 
dynamics in an objective and standard manner and predicting short-term tendencies.  
(5) Using the model for predicting short-term tendencies 
The model is finally used for a short-term prediction of the evolution of the cumulated number of cases. The 
predictions increase their reliability with the number of datapoints used in the fitting. Therefore, we consider 
three levels of prediction, depending on the country: 
                                                          




• Group A: prediction of expected cumulated cases for the following 3-5 days8; 
• Group B: prediction of expected cumulated cases for the following 2 days; 
• Group C: prediction of expected cumulated cases for the following day. 
The confidence interval of predictions is assessed with the Matlab function predint, with a 99% confidence 
level. These predictions are shown in the plots as red dots with corresponding error bars, and also gathered 
in the attached table. For series longer than 9 timepoints, last 3 points are weighted in the fitting so that 
changes in tendencies are well captured by the model. 
(6) Estimating non-diagnosed cases 
Lethality of Covid-19 has been estimated at around 1 % for Republic of Korea and the Diamond Princess 
cruise. Besides, median duration of viral shedding after Covid-19 onset has been estimated at 18.5 days for 
non-survivors9 in a retrospective study in Wuhan. These data allow for an estimation of total number of 
cases, considering that the number of deaths at certain moment should be about 1 % of total cases 18.5 days 
before. This is valid for estimating cases of countries at stage II, since in stage I the deaths would be mostly 
due to the incidence at the country from which they were imported. We establish a threshold of 50 reported 
cases before starting this estimation.  
Reported deaths are passed through a moving average filter of 5 points in order to smooth tendencies. Then, 
the corresponding number of cases is found assuming the 1 % lethality. Finally, these cases are distributed 
between 18 and 19 days before each one.  
 
                                                          
8 At this moment we are testing predictions at 4 days for countries with more than 100 cumulated cases for 13-15 
consecutive days, and 5 days for 16 or more days.  
9 Zhou et al., 2020. Clinical course and risk factors for mortality of adult 
inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: a retrospective 
cohort study. The Lancet; March 9, doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30566-3 
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